While there is evidence that an inclusion in the S&P indexes (interpreted as an increase in demand for stocks) has a positive effect on stock returns, the impact of a change in stock supply on stock returns has not been thoroughly examined yet. We analyze the stock price movements of 483 entry and 439 exit events of publicly-traded Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), finding that changes in the number of available REITs (via entries or exits of the REIT market) affect the stock returns of incumbent REITs, regardless of if we use the announcement date return or the monthly riskadjusted return as the return measure. We also partition the sample based on the reasons for entries and exits as well as by REIT asset type and management style in order to disentangle alternative explanations for the stock responses to the entry and exit events. Within the REIT laboratory we select for our analysis, we find that the supply explanation dominates the signaling and change in competitive environment hypotheses.
Introduction
Most economists would agree that the price of a commodity is determined by its supply and demand conditions. However, it might be fair to say that most financial economists have not paid much attention to demand and supply conditions when they analyze the movement of stock prices. Scholes (1972) argues that when stocks are perfect substitutes, riskless arbitrage will keep the demand curves for all stocks flat. Under this condition, there seems to be little incentive to examine if a change in the supply and demand conditions of a stock affects its price movements. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002, page 583) , however, also point out that "In reality, however, individual stocks do not have perfect substitutes". They further indicate that, since a riskless arbitrage requires a perfect hedge, risk-averse arbitrageurs might be less active in the stock market without perfect substitutes.
Empirically, Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986) provide the most direct evidence on the impact of a change in demand on stock returns. Shleifer (1986) demonstrates that the demand curves for stocks slope down by documenting that stocks newly included in the Standard and Poor's 500 Index earn a significant positive abnormal return at the announcement of the 1 inclusion. He also documents that the abnormal returns are positively related to measures of buying by index funds. Harris and Gurel (1986) examine the movements of prices and volumes surrounding changes in the composition of the S&P 500. They document that, immediately after an addition is announced, the prices of the newly included stocks increase by more than 3 percent. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) report that stocks without close substitutes experience higher price jumps upon inclusion into the S&P 500 Index. 1 The finance literature has also established some evidence that an increase in money supply affects stock returns. Sorensen (1982) cites quite a few studies that connect changes in the rate of growth in money supply to the associated movements in stock prices. He concludes that there is a relationship between money supply and stock returns. Thorbecke (1997) provides empirical evidence supporting the contention that an expansionary monetary policy increases ex-post stock returns. Warther (1995) might be the first to document a direct relationship between aggregate security returns and concurrent unexpected cash flows into mutual funds. Edelen and Warner (2001) study the relation between market returns and aggregate fund flow and find a concurrent positive daily relation.
2 However, an increase in the money supply could also carry new information about the future of economy. Given this, the evidence on the impact of fund flow on stock returns might still need to be interpreted with caution.
The above studies seem to establish some credible evidence that an increase in demand (money inflows and especially via an inclusion in the S&P index) can affect stock returns. If an increase in demand is correlated with higher stock returns, it is reasonable to expect that a change in the supply of stocks might also have an impact on stock returns. It might be fair to say that, except for the signaling aspect of some corporate restructuring related events, the relationship between a change in the supply of available stocks and security returns has largely been ignored in the past. However, recent studies on the effect IPOs have on the stock returns of rival firms have cast some spot light on this largely ignored issue. Baker and Wurgler (2000) might be the first to report that changes in the supply of stocks affect general stock valuation. They point out that the general stock market price level tends to fall after a period of active issuances of securities. Recent studies also indicate that competing firms experience a negative price reaction to completed IPOs in the same industry. For example, Braun and Larrain (2009) report direct evidence that shocks to the supply of stocks (via IPOs) have a significant effect on the stock prices of competing firms, especially those with high return covariance with the IPO firms. Hsu, Reed and Rocholl (2010) document that, because new firms entering the market might have a better competitive advantage (certification by underwriters and better knowledge capital) over existing competing firms, a new IPO lowers the returns of the competitors. Chod and Lyandres (2011) demonstrate that a firm's entry could hurt product market rivals, especially within industries with strong competitive interactions and large demand uncertainty. The recent evidence all seems to indicate that an increase in the supply of securities in the stock market via an IPO depresses the stock returns of competing firms, although the explanations offered for the stock reactions differ among studies.
In addition to the evidence provided in the IPO literature, Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) document that firms located in regions with relatively few firms per capita tend to have higher market-to-book valuations. They term this the "only-game-in-town" effect, which means that the supply level of firms in each region affects firm valuation. Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) , using maturity-weighted debt as the supply measure, report that an increase in the supply raises the yield of long-term government bonds (and, therefore, decreases the price of the bonds). While they attribute this supply effect (increase in the yield) to the change in the amount of interest-rate risk that has to be borne by arbitrageurs, their evidence also establishes a linkage between an increase in the supply of bonds and a decrease in the price of the bonds. Huschelrach and Muller (2013) find that routes exits due to liquidations in the airline industry lead to significant fare increases.
This means, at least in an oligopoly market, a reduction in the number of competitors might have a positive effect on the rival firms.
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A similar sentiment that demand and supply affect stock prices seems to be shared by some practitioners. For example, Constance Mitchell and Susan Scherreik (1/23/1990, J. C21, Wall Street Journal) report "Skittish investors boycotted the bond market yesterday for fear that a deluge of new supply will hammer prices". E.S. Browning (11/24/2003, J. C1, Wall Street Journal) also writes "In the stock market, supply and demand works the same way as with anything else. When demand goes up, or when supply falls, that is good for stock prices".
If the entry of new firms can affect the stock performance of the incumbent firms, we would expect an exit of an existing firm to have an opposite effect. 4 On this front, Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1991) report that bids to take firms private increase the value of the industry rivals of the target firms. They attribute this to the positive information associated with the buyout activities (the signaling explanation), However, this evidence also indicates that, although the assets of the company going private still remain in the product market, a reduction in the number of competing stocks in the public stock market might benefit the remaining publicly-traded firms. It should also be noted that the impact of a firm's exit on the stock returns of rival firms can be mixed once the signaling aspect of the exit is taken into consideration. For example, Eckel, Eckel and Singal (1997) document that the stocks of U.S. competitors fell 7% upon the privatization announcement of British Airways. They interpret that the result could be due to the fact that the market expects a more efficient British Airways. Ferris, Narayanan and Makhija (1997) examine the contagion and competitive effects announcements of bankruptcy have on the stock returns of rivals. They find that the stocks of rival firms (who should benefit from the exits of competitors) still react negatively to the announcement. In this case, the signaling effect might dominate the competitive effect. 5 An examination of the literature indicates that there are two important challenges a researcher needs to face when conducting a study on the stock price reactions of rival firms. The first challenge is to disentangle the reasons that might drive the price effect on the competing firms.
Among the plausible explanations, the first is related to the signaling effect and market timing.
For example, Eckel, Eckel and Singal (1997) , Ferris, Narayanan and Makhija (1997) , and Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1991) believe that an announcement of a going private, bankruptcy or liquidation decision might contain information about the market condition. Ritter (1991) , Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Baker and Wurgler (2000) believe that IPOs and SEOs issuers are able to take advantage of a transitory window of opportunity by issuing equity when they are substantially overvalued. Other researchers, such as Hsu, Reed and Rocholl (2010) and Chod and Lyandres (2011) , believe that the arrival of a new firm changes the operating environment of the incumbents and so the market reacts negatively. Braun and Larrain (2009) report that competing firms with high return covariance with the IPO firm have greater price response. If we extrapolate from the result they reported, it might be reasonable to argue that the price effect is caused by an increase in the number of similar firms in the market.
The second challenge in studying the stock reactions of rival firms is to identify the set of competitors of the firms in question. In the past, most researchers use different types of industry classification schemes or self-selected sets of matching criteria to identify competing firms.
However, there might still be significant differences in firm characteristics for industrial firms in the same industry code or classification. There is also limited guidance on what is the best way to select matching firms.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing direct evidence on whether the price reaction of incumbent firms can be attributed to a change in the supply level of competing stocks (caused by entries or exits of firms). Instead of focusing on selected entry events (such as IPOs) or exit events (certain corporate restructuring activities) for all industries taken together, we examine all types of entry and exit events tied to different reasons or motives for only one industry (REITs). An analysis based on subgroups of one industry might help us disentangle the possible explanations of the price impacts that have been reported in previous studies.
For our study, we select the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry as our laboratory for two main reasons. First, to be qualified as a REIT, a significant portion of a firm's assets and income must be real estate related and the firm must meet other regulatory restrictions on dividends payout and ownership structure. A qualified REIT also enjoys special tax savings on its corporate taxes. On the demand side, REITs are the only liquid investment vehicle that allows investors to invest in real estate with high dividend payouts. Given these unique characteristics and the regulatory requirements, it is fair to argue that REITs differ from other firms in the stock market and are competitors among themselves.
Second, a REIT is simply an entity that owns existing properties (and/or mortgages) in the real estate market. When a REIT enters into (or exits from) the public stock market, the condition of the underlying real estate markets still stays the same. Since the exit (or entry) of a REIT does not affect the underlying real estate market, the price impact of a REIT entry (or exit) on rival REITs should not be attributed to a change in the competitive environment of the underlying real estate market. Since the properties (or mortgages) owned by REITs are constantly traded in the property or debt markets, an entry or exit of a REIT should not carry much more private information than what is already known in the underlying property markets. Given this, if we use
REITs as the laboratory, we can worry less about the two competing hypotheses (signaling and change in competitive environment) hypotheses and instead focus our analysis on the supply effect.
We gathered 483 REIT entry and 439 REIT exit events during the 1973-2011 period for our analyses. Among these events, we can identify the announcement dates and reasons for 386 entry events and 364 exit events. Our main finding is that supply matters. An increase (decrease) in the number of REITs decreases (increases) the stock returns of incumbent REITs. This result holds regardless of if we use the announcement date returns or the market-adjusted monthly return as the return measure. In our analysis, we also pay special attention to see if signaling or a change in operating environment can also be a driver of the stock responses. Within the REIT laboratory we select for our analysis, we fail to find conclusive evidence to support these two possible explanations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses issues related to firms' entry and exit events and explains why we use REITs as the laboratory for this study. Section 3 describes the sample collection process and provides a general description of the reasons for REITs' entry and exit events. Section 4 analyzes the market-adjusted monthly returns of REITs in relation to
REITs' entry and exit events. In the section, we also examine the average abnormal returns (at both the announcement date and the market date) of incumbent REITs when there is an entry or exit event by another REIT. The abnormal returns of the incumbent REITs are then partitioned to 6 see if signaling or a change in competitive environment might potentially be a driver of the stock response. Section 5 concludes.
The use of REIT as a laboratory
One of the most challenging tasks in this study is to identify a homogeneous group in which the stocks within this group can be reasonably viewed as competitors. Most of the past studies identify competing firms using 4-digit (or 2-digit) SIC codes, 6-digit NAICS codes, or Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Some researchers select a group of competitors for each firm based on self-selected matching criteria. However, except for firms in some small oligopoly industries, it is reasonable to argue that industrial firms with the same SIC code can still differ in firm characteristics to certain degrees as they may operate in several main lines of business. There are no generally established guidelines that help researchers to select matching firms from the stock market to use as competitors.
Given this consideration, and after a review of the relevant literature, we decide to select the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry as the laboratory for analyzing our research question for four reasons. The first reason is the ease of identifying competitors. A firm (or trust) must meet several requirements in order to be qualified as a REIT. The first requirement is that a REIT has to pay out a significant portion (for example, 90%) of its taxable income as dividends.
Second, it must have a large investor base (for example, more than 100 investors and the largest five investors own no more than 50% of its total shares). Third, a significant portion of its gross income (for example, 75%) must come from real estate related sources such as rents, mortgage interests or sales of real estate. Fourth, at least 75% of its total assets must be in real estate. Once a firm is qualified as a REIT, the benefit is that it does not need to pay corporate income tax on the incomes that are qualified for the exemption. Since REITs own similar assets and have similar growth constraints (high dividend payout), it is reasonable to argue that REITs are similar to each other and, therefore, can be viewed as competitors of each other. This is especially true when REIT stocks are the only choice available to institutions or individual investors seeking a liquid way to invest in real estate.
Second, in general, the greater the homogeneity a researcher imposes when selecting firms for analysis, the smaller the sample size will be. This, however, might not be much of a problem if we use REITs as the laboratory. As we show in the next section, the REIT industry provides a reasonably sized sample for our study. Since its establishment in 1962, a total of 606 publicly traded REITs were formed by the end of 2011. Among them, 440 had ceased to exist in the stock market. During our 1973-2011 sample period, the minimum number of REITs in the market at any given year was 90 in 1984 and the maximum number of REITs was 230 in 1994. The total number of REITs and their entry and exit events offer a reasonable sample size to perform a robust analysis.
The third advantage to using REITs is related to signaling issues. REITs hold a portfolio of properties (equity REITs) or mortgages (mortgage REITs). Since investors can also obtain valuations of the underlying properties from the property markets, there is low uncertainty about the value of REIT stocks. In fact, Gokkaya et al. (2014) attribute the low price uncertainty of the underlying assets as a main reason for the observed low mean REIT IPO initial-day return. 6 Given this, since all properties owned by REITs are bought from property markets (where the price information is generated), an entry or exit of a REIT should not convey much more additional information about the future prospects of the property markets. In addition, if we partition our sample by examining REIT entry and exit events that have been publicly announced prior to the market date of the event, we should be able to test if signaling is the main driver of the stock responses of incumbents to the entry and exit of a competing REIT. Furthermore, if a REIT entering the market via an IPO (which brings in a new supply of liquid real estate) induces a stronger market reaction than a REIT entering the market via a spin-off or conversion (which involves a change in organizational structure without an increase in the supply of liquid real estate to the public stock market), then we may conclude that a change in asset supply might be a better explanation than the signaling story. Given this, instead of examining a single entry or exit event (such as an IPO or a liquidation) across all industries, our study examines all types of entry and exit events occurring in the REIT industry in an effort to disentangle the possible explanations for the price impact.
Fourth, Hsu, Reed and Rocholl (2010) and Chod and Lyandres (2011) document that an entry of new firms via IPOs can change the competitive environment of incumbent firms and affect 6 Chan, Chen and Wang (2013) 1962-2011 period. 9 In the process, we also collect information on the type of assets (equity or mortgage) the REIT holds and its management structure (external or internal). This information is collected for each REIT corresponding to the year in which the REIT enters or exits the public market.
The second (third) column of 
Sample description
An examination of Tables 2 and 3 show the number of REIT entry and exit events, respectively, that we identified in each year from 1973 to 2011. In total, there are 483 REIT entry events and 439 REIT exit events over the whole period. Of these, we can identify 386 announcement dates for the entry events and 364 announcement dates for the exit events.
Insert Tables 2 and 3 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the number of entering and exiting REITs is an 10 See http://www.crsp.com/products/documentation/development-crsp-stock-files for this information.
11 The NAREIT website, http://www.reit.com/DataAndResearch/Statistical-Publications/REITWatch.aspx, also provides historical information on REIT initial public offerings. Form S-11 is used to register securities that are issued by REITs or firms whose main business is acquiring or holding real estate for the purpose of investment. Edgar Online filing is available from 1995.
12 SNL Mergers & Acquisitions database defines the announcement date as "the date on which the deal was agreed upon if available, otherwise the date on which the earliest official public information regarding the event was obtained from a company, news outlet, or regulatory agency". In the SDC database, announcement date is defined as "the date one or more parties involved in the transaction makes the first public disclosure of common or unilateral intent to pursue the transaction (no formal agreement is required)". insignificant -0.07 when we include the months without any entering and exiting REITs. This result shows that entry events and exit events in the REIT industry are independent of each other.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
We define a firm becoming a new publicly-traded REIT as a new REIT entry event. New REIT entries can be classified into eight categories based on the entry mode: IPO, spin-off from a non-REIT, spin-off from a REIT, consolidation of LPs or funds into a REIT, merger of REITs into new REITs, conversion from a public firm to a REIT, a move from OTC to a major stock exchange, and an unknown mode. Table 2 Correspondingly, we define an exit of a publicly-traded REIT from the REIT market as a REIT exit event. The REIT exits are classified into nine categories based on the exit mode:
conversion to a non-REIT public firm, acquisition by an existing or a new public REIT, acquisition by a non-REIT public firm, going private, liquidation (wholesale, retail and unspecified), performance related delisting, and an unknown mode. Table 3 reports the number of REIT exits (and whether they have available announcement date information) in each of the above categories in each year during the 1973-2011 period.
It should be noted that, to sort the entry and exit events into different categories, we relied heavily on the information obtained from an examination of changes in the PERMNOs of the firms in the CRSP database. Comparing the PERMNOs of firms before and after an entry or exit event enables us to classify the event into different categories in a systematic way. Appendix A provides details of this classification scheme. An additional 15 REITs were spin-offs from either non-REIT firms or from existing REITs.
REIT entry types
Among them, 11 have announcement information. After the spin-offs, the newly created REITs will receive new PERMNOs. Three new REITs were formed through the consolidation of existing traded partnerships or funds and four new REITs were created as the result of consolidating existing traded REITs. We can find the announcement dates for five of them. The CRSP PERMNOs of the existing partnerships and funds terminate after the consolidation and each new REIT receives a new PERMNO. Forty REITs were converted from publicly traded companies or partnerships. After the conversion, the new REIT retains either the original PERMNO of the converting firm or receives a new CRSP PERMNO (and, in this case, the PERMNO of the converting firm terminates). We are able to identify 34 announcement dates for this conversion group. We find 27 REITs that were traded over-the-counter before they were listed on the major exchanges. However, we can only find 4 announcements for this group. We fail to identify the method of entry (and, therefore, the announcements) for 39 newly formed REITs.
REIT exit types
There are two major ways a REIT can exit the public REIT market. The first is for a REIT to give up its REIT status voluntarily (and change to an MLP or a corporation). The second way is via a (voluntary or involuntary) delisting from a stock exchange. In Table 3 , we observe 439
REIT exits during the 1973-2011 period. Among them, 74 were conversions from a REIT to a publicly traded non-REIT firm. The remaining 365 REITs were delisted from the stock exchange for various reasons. The delisting code that CRSP provides for each delisted REIT serves as a starting point for identifying the reason a REIT exits the public market. Of the 74 conversion events from a REIT status to a non-REIT status, 56 events have a news announcement. For the 365 observations with a delisting code, 129 REITs were delisted because they were either acquired by other publicly traded REITs or merged to form a new public REIT. Of these 129 events, 126 have announcement dates. We also find 47 REITs that were acquired by publicly traded non-REIT firms. Among them we can find a total of 46 announcements.
It should be noted that when we classify an exit as a merger or acquisition event, we require that the acquirer be a publicly traded company (could be a REIT or a non REIT). When a publiclytraded REIT is voluntarily acquired by a non-traded firm, we classify this exit as a going private event.
(In many cases, the non-traded acquirers are the majority shareholders of the acquired REITs.) Under this classification, we identify 80 going private events, of which 75 have announcement dates.
When a REIT decides to liquidate, there are two ways to do so. First, the REIT can sell all or most of its properties in a single transaction when the REIT announces its liquidation decision.
The second method is for the REIT to sell its assets based on market conditions or to just transfer the assets to a liquidating trust after adopting a liquidation plan. Among our exit events, we identify a total of 48 exit events with a liquidation motive. Among them, 43 have announcement dates. Forty-seven REIT exits are classified as performance-related delisting, most of which were due to bankruptcy or failure to meet stock exchange requirements. Among these 47 events, we can find a total of 18 announcements. Finally, we fail to identify the reason and announcement dates of 14 REIT exits.
Methodology and empirical results
In this section, we employ two methodologies to analyze if the entry or exit of REITs affects the stock performance of incumbent REITs. We first examine individual REIT's monthly marketadjusted stock returns to see if they are affected by an increase or a decrease in the supply of REIT stocks in the market. We then analyze the market-adjusted abnormal returns (and market-model abnormal returns) of incumbent REITs at the date when there is an announcement of a REIT entry or exit as well as at the dates when the new REITs are actually traded in the stock market (or when existing REITs are delisted from the market). Since there are several potential explanations for the stock response results, we partition the entry and exit events into different categories with a hope to disentangle the various effects on the stock returns of incumbent REITs.
Stock returns and REIT stock supply
To analyze if an entry and/or exit of REITs affects the market-adjusted stock returns of all other incumbent REITs in the market, we first regress the incumbent REITs' market-adjusted monthly stock returns on REIT entry and/or exit variables with and without control variables during the 1973-2011 period. We follow closely the variables used in Table 5 of Hsu, Reed and Rocholl (2010) for the selection of the dependent variable and control variables in the first set of regressions. Specifically, we estimate the following panel regression:
Market-adjusted Stock Returni,t = α + β × Entry and/or Exit indicatorsi,t + Controlsi,t + εi,t
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted stock return (Rit -EWRETDt), where Rit is the return of REITi in month t and EWRETDt is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted index in month t. We establish five variables to capture the effects of REIT entry and/or exit on incumbent REITs' stock returns. D_Entries_Only is a dummy variable equal to one if there are only REIT entries and no REIT exits in month t. D_Exits_Only is a dummy variable equal to one if there are only REIT exits and no REIT entries in month t. It should be noted that our definitions of the entry and exit dummy variables exclude the months that have both entry and exit events in the same month. This is necessary since we expect the entry and exit events to have opposite effect on the stock returns. Since multiple entry or exit events in the same month might have a stronger supply effect on competitors than a single event, we use the variable # of Entries (# of Exits) to denote the number of REIT entries (exits) in month t and the variable # of (Entries -Exits) to denote the number of REIT entries minus the number of REIT exits in month t. A positive (negative) # of (Entries -Exits) indicates that there are more (less) entries than exits during the month t. We expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative.
We also establish three control variables that might affect the market-adjusted stock returns of REITs. The first control variable is the lag market-adjusted stock return. This variable captures the impact of the past performance of a REIT on its current stock return. The second and third control variables are Size and B/M (book-to-market equity ratio). We measure Size as the natural log of REITi's market value of equity in June of year t computed using CRSP data. Following Fama and French (1992) , we compute the book-to-market equity ratio (B/M) using a REIT's book equity at end of fiscal year t-1 from Compustat and its market equity at the end of December of year t-1 from CRSP. 14 It should be noted that out of the 606 REITs that have information from CRSP, only 573 have book equity value data in Compustat. We also exclude from our sample 143 monthly observations with negative book equity. This means that when control variables are included in the analysis, the number of observations will be reduced.
We run 14 panel regressions based on Equation (1) Table 4 reports the regression results when control variables are excluded (included). The sample comprises as many months as possible for each REIT during this period. We estimate the regressions using firm fixed effects and, therefore, have a separate constant term for each REIT in the sample. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering in firm.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Regressions 1 to 3 in Panel A of Table 4 As a robustness check, we further run a panel regression (with firm fixed effects) using incumbent REITs' monthly stock returns in excess of the monthly risk-free rate (Rit -Rft ) as the dependent variable, where Rit is the return on REIT i in month t, and Rft is the risk-free return in month t obtained from Kenneth French's website. We also use the same set of REIT entry and/or exit indicator variables as that used in the Regressions 1 to 7 of Table 4 as the explanatory variables.
We use (Rm -Rf), Fama and French (1993) factors and Carhart's (1997) momentum factor as the control variables. Rf and the factors (HML, SML and WML) used in the regressions are obtained from Kenneth French's website. We use EWRETDt, the equally-weighted index in month t from CRSP, to proxy for Rm. Table 5 reports the result.
Insert Table 5 about here.
The results reported in Regressions 1 to 7 of Table 5 support the main results reported in Table 4 . The qualitative conclusion from both Tables 4 and 5 is the same. Regression 1 (2) reports that the entry (exit) of REIT(s) has a significant negative (positive) effect on the remaining REIT stocks. The # of Entries coefficient is not significant in Regressions 4 and 6 while the # of Exits coefficient is positive and significant in Regressions 5 and 6. Regression 7 reports that the coefficient for the # of (Entries -Exits) is, as expected, negative and significant.
To summarize, our findings reported in tables 4 and 5 indicate that REIT entry or exit affects the stock performance of incumbent REITs. Our empirical evidence so far indicates that the market-adjusted monthly return of incumbent REITs decreases if the month has new REIT(s) entering into the market. On the other hand, the market-adjusted monthly return increases if there are one or more REITs exiting the market during the month. However, one might wonder why the stocks of incumbent REITs react at the month of entry or exit. Since the decisions of entries and exits might be known in advance, should the stocks react at the date when the information is released to the market? In the next subsection, we will employ the standard event study methodology to further our understanding on when and to what extent incumbent REITs react to entry and exit events.
Abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around event dates
We use the event study methodology to compute the market-adjusted abnormal return and market-model abnormal return of incumbent REITs around REIT entry or exit events. We analyze the events around their announcement dates as well as their market dates (the date at which a REIT officially trades in the REIT stock market or delists/exits from the REIT stock market).
To measure the stock price response of incumbent REITs to a new REIT entry or an existing REIT exit, we form an equally-weighted portfolio of all incumbent REITs that are publicly traded at the time of a particular event. The REITs we use to form the REIT portfolio include all the 606 REITs we identified in the 1962-2011 period (see Table 1 ). The market-adjusted abnormal returns for the incumbent REIT portfolio (Apt = Rpt -Rmt) are computed by subtracting the return on the market index on day t, Rmt, from the return on the REIT portfolio on day t, Rpt. We use the CRSP equally-weighted index return to proxy for the market return. To calculate the marketmodel abnormal return of the incumbent REIT portfolio, we assume that the portfolio returns follow a single factor market model, Rpt = αj + βj Rmt + εpt. The market-model abnormal return for the REIT incumbent portfolio p on day t is defined as Apt = Rpt -( � +̂ Rmt ). The coefficients � and ̂ are ordinary least squares estimates of αj and βj, estimated from the market model using a 255-day period (from 316 to 61 days prior to the event). Similar to Eckel, Eckel, and Singal (1997), Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997) , and Chod and Lyandres (2011), we report the three-day (-1, +1) mean cumulative average abnormal return.
As noted in Table 2 , we identify 483 REIT entry market dates during the 1973-2011 period.
Of these 483 entry dates, 280 are not preceded nor followed by another REIT entry in the three days (-1, +1) surrounding the market date. We refer these 280 events as the Single Entry group.
To avoid the problem that the impact of an entry of a REIT could be contaminated and diluted by the exit of another REIT, we establish a Pure Entry group. This Pure Entry group contains 229 entry dates that are not preceded nor followed by any other REIT entry or exit in the three days surrounding the market date. For the 439 exit market dates that we report in Table 3 , we classify the 291 (out of the 439) exit dates that are not preceded nor followed by another REIT exit in the three days surrounding the exit market date as the Single Exit group. The Pure Exit group contains 246 exit dates that are not preceded nor followed by any other entry or exit dates in the three day window. Of the 364
REIT exit decisions with an announcement date reported in Insert Table 6 about here.
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The announcement date results reported in Panel A of Overall, these results are consistent with our expectations and with our findings in Tables 4 and 5 that when REITs enter (or exit from) the public REIT market, they elicit significant negative (positive) stock price responses from incumbent REITs. This finding also demonstrates that a change in the supply level of REIT stocks affects the stock returns of rival REITs.
It is a puzzle, however, as to why the supply effect is only significant at the market date and not at the announcement date of the event. One would expect that once the market receives information on a REIT's entry or exit decision, the stock prices of incumbent REITs should immediately react to the information at the announcement date. If this conjecture is correct, then the price response of incumbent REITs should not be very significant when the event actually happens (that is, at the first trading date or at the delisting date).
Braun and Larrain (2009) may offer a possible explanation for the insignificant price reaction at the announcement date of entry decisions. The study documents that incumbent firms with high return covariance with IPO firms tend to be affected by the entry of the new firms. Given this, it is possible that the market does not have all the information about the return characteristics of the new entering firms at the announcement date as the new stocks have yet to trade. In addition, it is possible that the announced new entries might be withdrawn at a later date. 15 Given these two possible explanations, some of the supply effect could be revealed at the market date, and not at the announcement date. It is also possible that announcements of exits (such as liquidations) might convey to the market information other than a reduction in supply. 16 Since there might be confounding signals conveyed by an exit decision, it could explain why exit announcements do not trigger significant price responses. While there are possible explanations for this result, there seems to be a need to further analyze the relationship between the market price response on the announcement day and that on the market date.
Relationship between announcement and market dates
We first examine if there is a significant difference in the abnormal returns around the market dates between a group of REIT entry and exit events that are preceded by an announcement and a group that does not have a prior announcement. An insignificant difference between the two groups would lead us to conclude that the significant market date result is independent of a prior news announcement of the event. Table 7 reports the result based on this partitioning.
Insert Table 7 about here.
Columns 2 to 4 of Panel A (B) report the CMARs (CMMARs) of the group without a prior news announcement of the event while columns 5 to 7 report the same result for the group with a prior news announcement. The last two columns of the table report the difference (and its significance level) in the abnormal returns between the two groups. We use the difference-inmeans t-test to analyze if the difference is significantly different from zero. It is noteworthy that the number of observations of the group with prior news announcements is about three times larger than that of the group without prior news announcements. Table 7 reports mixed results. The difference-in-means results reported in the last two columns of the table show no significant difference in the abnormal returns between these two groups, regardless of the sample and estimation method used. This indicates that the price response at the market date is, on average, the same regardless of whether there are prior news announcements of the event. Most importantly, columns 5 to 7 report that the abnormal returns of both entry and exit events with prior announcements are, in general, significant and with the expected signs. This is an important result because it indicates that the market reaction to the events are significant at the market dates even if the events have been announced at earlier dates, which in turn suggests that signaling and market timing stories might be suitable to explain this result. However, columns 2 to 4 report a different result for the events without prior announcements. Except for the entry sample and single entry sample, when the CMMAR method is used, all the abnormal returns for the other groups are insignificant. This result is difficult to interpret and we suspect that they are caused by the small sample sizes.
Columns 8 and 9 of Table 7 also show that, although the differences are not statistically significant, the abnormal returns of the groups without prior announcements are generally larger than that of the groups with prior announcements. Given this, we suspect that there might be a relationship between the abnormal returns at the announcement date and at the market date. Table   8 explores this possibility by regressing the abnormal returns of the market date on the abnormal returns of the announcement date.
Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 8 report that none of the coefficients for the entry events are significant, regardless of whether we use the CMAR or CMMAR method to calculate the abnormal returns. This result indicates that, for the entry events, the abnormal return at the announcement date does not predict the price response at the market date. This result makes sense since, at the announcement date, the incumbent firms do not know much about the return characteristics of the new entry firm. It is also consistent with the evidence provided by Braun and Larrain (2009) that incumbent firms with high return covariance with IPO firms tend to be affected by the entry of new firms. From this evidence, we predict that REITs entering into the market with unknown assets might cause a stronger reaction from incumbent REITs at the market dates.
Insert Table 8 about here.
However, columns 5 to 7 of Table 8 report that a high abnormal return at the announcement date predicts a high abnormal return at the market date of an exit event. This positive relationship suggests that the impact of an exit event on the incumbents' stock prices should be similar for both the announcement date and the market date. The impact of the announcement date return on the market date return is quite weak as the regression coefficient is around 10% (with CMMAR) to 11% (with CMAR) when the pure group is used. Together with the evidence that the significant price reactions at the market date are independent of whether there was an announcement about the event, it seems that the announcement of an entry or exit event receives an insignificant response from the market. Insert Table 9 about here.
Reasons behind entry and exit events
Since our hypothesis is that an increase (decrease) in the supply level of firms will affect the stock performance of the incumbents, an entry through an IPO might have more impact on the stock responses than other entry types (such as a spinoff, consolidation, merger, and move from another exchange) for two reasons. First, an IPO introduces a brand new asset into the market and thus adds new supply to the market. A spin off, consolidation or merger might be viewed as a restructure of existing assets. A move from the OTC to a stock exchange, although enhances liquidity, is just a change in trading. Second, as Braun and Larrain (2009) point out, shocks to incumbents are related to the return covariance with the new entry firm. While investors in the stock market can more or less infer the return characteristics of the new stock if it was traded on the OTC market (or entered the market via spin off, consolidation or merger), they will not be able to learn about the return characteristics of an IPO firm until it is close to its trading date. Along the same line of argument, a new REIT entering the market through a spinoff or consolidation of non-REITs should have a larger impact on the price movement of incumbents than if the new REIT were a spinoff or consolidation of existing REITs (since investors already know the return characteristics of the existing REITs). This argument implies that REITs moving from OTC to a major stock exchange should have the least impact among the four categories of exit.
When a REIT converts to a non-REIT or is acquired by a non-REIT, its assets are completely removed from the REIT industry. However, when a REIT exits the market because it is acquired by an existing REIT, its assets still remain in the REIT market even though the firm ceases to exist. Given this, the price impact of the first group should be stronger than the second group at the market date. When a REIT exits the market because it is voluntarily delisted (going private) or liquidated the event should solicit a strong price reaction since the REIT's assets will be removed from the stock market completely. However, a going private or a voluntary liquidating event normally happens when the value of a REIT's stock is lower than the value of its underlying assets. Since this undervaluation condition usually happens when the REIT industry is performing poorly, it might not be easy to detect a positive abnormal return from the incumbent firms under this circumstance.
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Panels A, B and C of Table 9 report the results using the pure entry and pure exit samples, single entry and single exit samples, and entry and exit samples, respectively. The results reported in the first part of the three panels (related to entry events) seem to support our hypotheses. Among the five subcategories we use, the negative stock responses of the incumbent REITs are significant for REIT entries via IPOs, regardless of the estimation method used. The stock response of incumbent REITs to the entry events via a spinoff or conversion from a non-REIT is significant only when the CMAR method is used. 18 As expected, the stock reactions to the other categories are not significant.
If an entry of a new firm should convey signals to the market about the current and future market conditions, then an entry should convey the same signals regardless of whether it is an entry via an IPO, spin off, conversion or other methods. Since only the stock reaction is significant for entries via an IPO, it gives less credence to the signaling argument and more weight to our 17 We also check the mean CMARs and mean CMMARs of entry and exit announcements categorized by the reason for the pure entry and pure exit samples (the results are not reported here). Except for the liquidation group, all the mean abnormal returns of the entry and exit announcement subcategories are not significant. 18 We noted that there is a significant difference between the CMAR (-0.49%) and CMMAR (0.07%) for this subsample. The problem is caused by some outliers. Using the pure sample (with 27 observations) as the example, we find three observations with low betas (less than 0.5), while the corresponding 3-day cumulative market returns (Rm) are very high (around 4%). We also find another observation with very a high beta (1.65) and the 3-day cumulative market return (Rm) is -3.55%. This explains the result since CMAR -CMMAR = Alpha + (Beta -1) * Rm. However, since these events are not clustered over time, we decided not to handle this outlier issue.
argument that a change in the supply level of competing stocks affects the value of the stocks. We also regress the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns of the incumbent REITs on the initial-dayreturns of the IPOs, finding that the coefficients are significantly positive for both the single sample (with 196 observations) and the pure sample (with 165 observations), regardless of whether the CMAR or CMMAR method is used for estimating the abnormal return. If the IPO return moves in tandem with the incumbent firms' returns, then it is less likely that the significantly negative returns of the incumbents at the event dates are caused by the negative signal conveyed by IPOs with positive initial-day-returns at the same dates.
The second half of Panels A, B and C in Table 9 reports the stock price reactions of incumbent REITs to REIT exit events at the market date via various exit modes. As expected, when a REIT exits the REIT market by converting to a non-REIT and becoming part of a non-REIT firm, the stock price reactions of incumbent REITs are significantly positive. When a REIT is acquired by an existing REIT, the positive reaction is not conclusive. It is only significant when the CMMAR method is used for the pure exit and single exit samples and the magnitudes of the positive responses are lower than that of the first group (acquired by non-REITs). As expected, the stock responses for the other two groups are insignificant, probably due to the unfavorable market conditions when these types of events normally happen. We also fail to detect a significant stock price response when REIT exits are due to delisting or unknown reasons.
This evidence also provides some support to our argument. A conversion to a non-REIT means that the assets of the exiting REIT will be totally removed from the REIT industry. An acquisition by existing REITs means that the assets of the exiting REIT will still remain in the 1973, 1985-1986, 1988, 1993-1994, 1996-1998, 2004-2005 as hot periods and the remaining periods as cold periods.
19
Insert Table 10 about here. Table 10 reports the mean CMARs and mean CMMARs of the incumbent REITs in the hot period and the cold period when the pure sample, single sample and full sample are used. For each group, the table also reports the return difference between the hot period and the cold period as well as between non-IPOs and IPOs. The difference in the means between the hot period and cold period (as well as between non-IPOs and IPOs) are all insignificant for both the pure sample and the single sample. For the full sample, the difference in returns between the hot and cold periods is significant only when CMAR is used for the analysis. However, this result shows that the price reaction from the competing REITs is more negative in the cold period than in the hot period. To summarize, the analyses of return differences between the hot and cold periods do not provide evidence to support the signaling or hot market hypotheses. Our analyses of the return differences between non-IPOs and IPOs, in general, also yield insignificant results except for the full sample when the CMMAR measure is used. The latter result suggests that the price reaction from the competing REITs is more negative for IPOs than non-IPOs, which is similar to what we have previously shown in Table 9 . 
Asset composition and management structure

Conclusions
This paper examines if changes in asset supply affect the stock returns of competing firms in the stock market. Past studies in the literature typically examine the price impact of one particular type of entry (such as an IPO) or exit (such as a bankruptcy) event. We analyze all types and reasons of entry and exit events using REITs as the laboratory. The use of REITs as our laboratory allows us to identify competitors with ease, as a firm must meet a set of requirements to be qualified as a REIT. Furthermore, since REITs hold similar real properties (or mortgages) and have a small operating component relative to industrial firms, an entry or exit of a REIT is less likely to carry significant signals to incumbent REITs or change the operating environment of the REIT industry.
We find that changes in asset supply are correlated with the stock performance of incumbent firms. By analyzing the reasons for entry and exit events and partitioning the sample by asset type or management style, we could not find evidence to support that signaling effects or changes in the operating environment might be the reason for the observed price responses from the competing REITs. We also examine the price responses at the market dates of events that had been announced to the public prior to the market dates, finding similar significant responses from incumbent REITs. Furthermore, the price reactions of competing firms to the new entries via an IPO are about the same for periods with high or low issuance activities. Given this, we fail to find evidence to indicate that the significant stock price reactions of incumbent firms to the entry or exit of rival firms are a response to the signals conveyed by the entry or exit events.
The finding of this paper seems to complement the findings of studies on the impact of an inclusion to S&P index on the price of the newly added stock. If an increase demand (assumed to be caused by the inclusion in the S&P index) can affect the price of the stock, it is reasonable to expect that a change in the supply of stocks should also affect the performance of competing stocks. By using a unique group of stocks (that qualifies as REITs) as the laboratory, our paper provides evidence to support this intuition. Table 1 REIT versus stock entries and exits. This table presents the distribution by year of REIT versus stock entries and exits during the period 1962 to 2011. An entry (exit), with the exception of a REIT conversion event, is identified by the first (last) price appearance of a REIT or stock (PERMNO) in the CRSP tape. In the case of REITs converting from (or to) a public corporation or limited partnership, an entry (exit) is identified by the start (end) date of the effective company name under REIT status (if there is a name change) or from the firm's annual report or news articles (if there is no name change). The entry and exit dates for each REIT in the sample are jointly verified from the LEXIS-NEXIS database and Factiva News release. The percentage of entries (exits) in each year is the number of entries (exits) in that year divided by the total number of entries (exits) in the 1962-2011 period. Market capitalization is computed as the year end price multiplied by the year end number of outstanding shares. 
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28 (24) 2 (2) 18 (16) Table 4 The effect of REIT entry and exit events on incumbent REITs' market-adjusted stock returns. This table reports estimates from a panel regression (with firm fixed effects) of publicly-listed incumbent REITs' market-adjusted monthly stock return on REIT entry and/or exit indicator variables, without and with control variables . The dependent variable is Rit -EWRETDt, where Rit is the return on REIT i in month t, and EWRETDt is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted index in month t. D_Entries_Only is a dummy variable equal to one if there are only REIT entries and no REIT exits in month t. D_Exits_Only is a dummy variable equal to one if there are only REIT exits and no REIT entries in month t. # of Entries is the number of REITs entries in month t. # of Exits is the number of REITs exits in month t. # of (Entries -Exits) is the number of REITs entries minus the number of REIT exits in month t. Lag dependent variable, Size and B/M serve as control variables in Panel B. Size is the natural log of REIT i's market value of equity in June of year t computed from CRSP. B/M is the book-to-market equity ratio computed using a REIT's book equity at end of fiscal year t-1 from Compustat and its market equity at the end of December of year t-1 from CRSP. 575 of the 606 REITs (1973 REITs ( -2011 Table 5 The effect of REIT entry and exit events on incumbent REITs' stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate. This table reports estimates from a panel regression (with firm fixed effects) of publicly-listed incumbent REITs' monthly stock returns in excess of the monthly risk-free rate on REIT entry and/or exit indicator variables, Rm -Rf , Fama and French (1993) Table 7 Abnormal returns of incumbent REIT portfolios around market dates of REIT entry and exit events, without and with prior news announcements. This table reports in Panels A and B, respectively, the 3-day mean cumulative market-adjusted and market-model abnormal returns (CMAR and CMMAR) of incumbent REIT portfolios around the market dates of entry and exit events categorized by whether the market date is preceded by a news announcement of the event. The news announcement corresponds to the first appearance of public news about an REIT entry or exit event. The market date of an entry (exit) event corresponds to the date of first (last) price appearance of a REIT (PERMNO) in the CRSP tape, or in the case of conversions, the start (end) date of the effective company name under REIT status (if there is a name change) or the date given in the firm's annual report or news articles (if there is no name change). Entry (Exit) includes all entry (exit) events, Single Entry (Single Exit) excludes events preceded or followed by another entry (exit) event in the 3-day window and Pure Entry (Pure Exit) denotes events not preceded nor followed by any entry or exit events in the 3-day window. Statistical significance of the means is examined with Patell Z-statistic and the difference in means is examined with t-tests. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Table 9 Abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around market dates for REIT entry or exit events, by sample and event type. This table reports the mean cumulative market-adjusted (market-model) abnormal return, CMAR (CMMAR), of incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry and exit market dates, categorized by sample and entry/exit type. Entry and exit types are as defined in Tables 2 and 3 , respectively. Sample categories (pure, single, and full), CMAR and CMMAR are as defined in Table 10 Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs around market dates for REIT IPO versus non-IPO events. This table reports the mean cumulative market-adjusted (market-model) abnormal return, CMAR (CMMAR), of incumbent REIT portfolios in the 3-day window (-1, +1) surrounding REIT entry market dates, categorized by sample (Pure, Single and Full), entry type (IPO vs. non-IPO), and IPO period (hot vs. cold). Full sample includes all entry events, Single sample excludes events preceded or followed by another entry event in the 3-day window and Pure sample denotes events not preceded nor followed by any entry or exit events in the 3-day window. IPOs correspond to entry type (1) while Non-IPOs correspond to entry types (2) to (5) in Table 8 . A hot (cold) IPO period is defined as a period with ten or more (nine or fewer) REIT IPOs in any given year. Based on this definition, the hot REIT IPO periods are : 1973, 1985-1986, 1988, 1993-1994, 1996-1998, and 2004-2005 . Statistical significance of the means is examined with Patell Z-statistic. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Non-IPOs -IPOs (t-value in parenthesis) -0.08% (-0.81) 0.17% (2.03)** Table 11 Cumulative abnormal returns of incumbent REITs by sub-periods, asset type and advisor style. This table reports the 3-day (-1, +1) CMAR and CMMAR of incumbent REIT portfolios around REIT entry and exit market dates for the full, single and pure samples of entry and exit events. The full sample comprises of all entry or exit events, the single sample comprises of entry (exit) events not preceded nor followed by another entry (exit) event in the 3-day window, and the pure sample comprises of events not preceded nor followed by any entry or exit events in the 3-day window. CMAR and CMMAR are as previously defined. The results are partitioned by the asset type of both the newly entered (exited) REIT and the incumbent REIT portfolio (Panel A), and by the advisor style of both the newly entered (exited) REIT and the incumbent REIT portfolio (Panel B). To illustrate, the category "Equity on Mortgage" in Panel A reports the effect of a newly entered (or exited) equity REIT on the abnormal returns of a portfolio of incumbent mortgage REITs. Similarly in Panel B, the category "Internal on External" reports the effect of a newly entered (or exited) internally advised REIT on an incumbent REIT portfolio comprising of only externally advised REITs. We report Patell Z statistics within parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
